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SHIFTING PUBLIC HEALTH PRIORITIES AND
THE GLOBAL EFFORT TO PREVENT A BIRD FLU PANDEMIC
Robert Gatter1
Introduction
Global strategy to control highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has changed
dramatically since 2003 when it was first reported that a confirmed bird flu jumped the species
barrier to infect a human in Hong Kong. 2 What started as a three-year project to control and
eradicate HPAI is already entering its eighth year, and the United Nation‟s Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) announced in 2011 that the goal of eliminating HPAI from countries where
it is now endemic cannot be achieved for at least another ten years. 3 What started as a standalone project targeting HPAI has been folded into a much larger initiative – “One World, One
Health”4 – to overhaul animal and human disease surveillance and data-sharing infrastructure so
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as to better track and respond to a host of diseases residing at the animal-human interface.5 And
what started as program to prevent HPAI infections of poultry and humans by focusing primarily
on backyard farmers in developing countries has shifted to a program primarily concerned with
preparing for a potential pandemic and focusing prevention efforts on commercial poultry
producers. As a result, prevention is taking a backseat to response strategies, and, within
prevention efforts, the welfare of thousands of backyard poultry farmers is taking a backseat to
biosecurity in commercial poultry sectors.
Evidence of this shift in priorities in the global fight against HPAI can be found most
clearly in program funding trends. In late 2008 and into 2009, financial commitments from
international donors for all HPAI programs dropped significantly. 6 Meanwhile, within HPAI
programs, funding shifted substantially away from animal biosecurity projects and into human
response and preparedness work.7
This Article examines the reasons for this shift in priorities. It highlights three reasons in
particular: the global experience with the H1N1 pandemic, the rise of the “One Health”
movement, and hard-learned lessons about both the locus of HPAI risk within the various sectors
of poultry production in developing nations and the difficulty of changing behaviors in the name
of making poultry production more secure. The Article concludes that the twin strategies of (1)
building a public health infrastructure that can better respond to HPAI infections and (2)
boosting preparedness for a potential human pandemic, while well-intentioned, are siphoning
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resources away from HPAI prevention at least in the short-run. Likewise, the strategy within
HPAI prevention of concentrating efforts to improve biosecurity in commercial poultry
production sectors leaves the vulnerable population in the backyard sector at greater risk for
poultry infections that threaten their livelihoods and human infections that threaten their lives
unless and until the benefits of commercial biosecurity trickle down to the backyard sector. In
the end, we cannot afford public health strategies that short-shrift HPAI programs generally or
HPAI prevention efforts in particular – including prevention efforts in the backyard farming
sector – while focusing on other priorities.

A. The Pandemic Risk of HPAI and Strategies for Managing that Risk
HPAI poses a risk to human health worldwide primarily because it is a very likely source
of a novel influenza. Novel influenza strains that infect and are readily communicable among
humans pose a pandemic risk because humans have not had an opportunity to build a natural
immunity to such strains.8 Consequently, a new strain has the potential to ravage defenseless
human populations quickly. Indeed, it was novel strains that killed as many as 100 million
people worldwide in 1918-1919, one million worldwide in 1957-1958, and 40,000 in the U.S.
alone in 1967-1968.9
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Influenza viruses mutate rapidly and resort their genetic make-up easily. 10 As a result,
novel influenza strains have a greater chance of emerging as compared to other infectious
diseases the cellular and genetic make-up of which remain more stable over time. 11
While novel influenza strains can emerge as a result of mutations of strains already
circulating among humans, a novel strain with pandemic potential among humans is more likely
to develop from an animal influenza that combines in new ways with other animal and human
strains.12 This is because animal strains are already significantly different from human strains,
which increases the likelihood that humans lack any pre-existing immunity to those strains. The
species barrier often prevents animal influenza strains from leaping to humans, but that barrier
can be breached where there are opportunities for animal and human strains to combine into a
novel strain that incorporates elements of the human strain so as to permit human infection. 13
HPAI is of particular concern precisely because it arises from an environment where
domestic and wild birds, domestic swine and humans interact routinely, giving ample
opportunity for novel strains to develop that are capable of crossing the species barrier to infect
humans.14 Avian influenza originated in wild aquatic birds that migrate (e.g., ducks and geese)
and was passed to domesticated birds, including chickens, as wild birds visit and share space
with those domesticated birds.15 There are further opportunities for inter-species mutations of
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influenza where small-scale farmers combine fish and duck farming over warm-water ponds,16
and where domestic poultry come in close contact with swine on the same farm. 17 Humans
caring for domesticated birds, as well as perhaps fish and swine, come in close contact with those
animals, creating routine opportunities for avian influenza strains to combine with human strains
so as to start the process by which mutations could result in a strain that can leap the species
barrier to infect humans.18 Moreover, such close contact between human farmers and their
domesticated animals also permits infection with a novel avian influenza strain.
The initial global strategy to combat HPAI was based on a common story that a
worrisome source of HPAI was backyard farmers from villages in several developing nations in
southeast Asia and Africa. 19 Public health officials recognize four categories of poultry
producers in these nations: large commercial producers (sector 1), moderately sized commercial
producers (sector 2), small-scale commercial producers (sector 3), and backyard or residential
producers (sector 4).20 There was some evidence that commercial producers, especially in
sectors 1 and 2, already employed biosecurity measures that diminished the risk of HPAI
Migratory Birds to Blame? Infected Birds on Long Flights May Have Spread the Virus, The Straits Times
(Singapore) A4 (Jan 28, 2004); Garrett, supra note 9 at 5.
16
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infections. At the same time, there was clear evidence that backyard farmers engaged in
husbandry practices that increased the risk of HPAI infections. 21 These included the fact that
domestic poultry were kept in communal flocks where different varieties of poultry were mixed
and often come into contact with domestic animals of other species.22 Additionally, backyard
farmers have neither the facilities nor the means to build facilities to isolate sick poultry from
others in the flock or otherwise invest in biosecurity measures.23 Similarly, wild birds that visit
these villages as they migrate mix with the domestic poultry that wander freely in common
village areas. 24 Finally, backyard farmers and their families live in close contact with poultry. 25
All of this increases the likelihood that HPAI is introduced and transmitted among backyard
poultry and between poultry and humans. It also increases the chances for viral re-assortment as
an HPAI virus moves among various species.
Given this initial story of HPAI risk, global efforts targeted backyard farming practices. 26
This perception was fed also by data showing that HPAI infection among humans was
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also J. Otte et al., Evidence-Based Policy for Controlling HPAI in Poultry: Bio-Security Revisited, Research Report,
Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative at 2 (December 2006) available at
http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/pplpi/docarc/rep-hpai_biosecurity.pdf (referring to the widespread
assumption that backyard poultry farming is a primary source for the risk of an HPAI outbreak).
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significantly associated with handling diseased or dead poultry. 27 In an effort to prevent and
respond to HPAI outbreaks in this sector, public health experts conducted many interventions to
educate village farmers about pathogens, about the risk of HPAI to their poultry and to
themselves, about reporting illness among their poultry to local officials, about isolating sick
poultry from the rest of the flock, about the value of vaccination, about destroying infected
poultry and cleaning or destroying their coops, and about personal hygiene after coming into
contact with poultry.28

B. Evidence of Shifting Priorities Away From HPAI Prevention
From 2004 through mid-2008, HPAI work was among the highest of global public health
priorities. FAO reports that funding for this work increased steadily from 2004 through 2007. 29
In the peak years of 2006 and 2007, donors provided upwards of $80 million each year for HPAI
projects.30 Starting in 2008, however, funding dropped substantially. For the years 2008, 2009
and 2010, pledged funds dropped by half, averaging about $40 million annually. 31
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See Sonja J Olsen et al., Poultry-Handling Practices During Avian Influenza Outbreak, Thailand, 11 Emerging
Infectious Diseases 1601 (Oct. 2005). See also CIDRAP, Avian Influenza (Bird Flu): Implications for Human
Disease: H5N1 in Humans: Epidemiologic Features, available at
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/biofacts/avflu_human.html#top.
28

See e.g., id.; MH Hafez et al, Acian Influenza H5N1 Virus Infections in Vaccinated Commercial and Backyard
Poultry in Egypt, 89 Poultry Science 1609 (2010); Dilip P Bhandari et al., Preventing Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza (HPAI) at the Rural Community Level: A Case Study from Cambodia, 43 Tropical Animal Health and
Production 1071 (2011); Sonja J Olsen et al., supra note 27.
29
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Pathogenic Avian Influenza at 19 figure 2.1 (2011).
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As funding dropped, so too did the initiation of new HPAI projects. On average, 24 new
projects were started each year over the seven-year period from 2004-2010.32 When annual
pledges dropped, the number of annual start-up projects fell well below that average. Eighteen
new projects were initiated in 2009, and only six were started in 2010. 33 While the reductions in
HPAI funding and projects coincide with the global financial crisis, 34 they are more likely the
result of a shift in public health priorities to address diseases at the animal-human interface other
than HPAI, which shift is discussed in detail below.
At the same time, funding data also reveals a shift of priorities within HPAI work.
Projects related to HPAI can be sorted into prevention work and response work.35 Prevention
projects, as the name implies, are those designed to minimize the risk of infection in either
poultry or humans. These specifically include projects aimed at improving the biosecurity of
poultry production in developing nations. By contrast, response projects focus on the postinfection phase.
From 2005 through mid-2008, funding for HPAI work was distributed fairly evenly
between prevention, on the one hand, and response programs, on the other. The UN and World
Bank report that donor nations and international organizations committed about $700 million to
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See id. at 17 figure 2.1 (based on 168 total HPAI projects through December 2010).

33

See id. at 19.
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See Murray et al, Development Assistance for Health: Trends and Prospects, 378 The Lancet 9785 (July 2, 2011)
(providing data showing that funding for global health programs generally declined in 2009 and 2010 shortly after
the start of the global economic crisis).
35

See FEMA, Fundamentals of Emergency Management, available at http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/fem.asp
(last updated August 31, 2011). Prevention work is also referred to as “risk mitigation.” Response work includes,
not only projects that occur after an infection, but also to pre-infection projects designed to prepare for an effective
response.
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projects in each category from late 2005 through mid-2008.36 Starting in 2008, however, there
was a dramatic change. International commitments for HPAI response programs jumped by
about $1.4 billion over about a 20-month period ending in December 2009.37 Meanwhile, only
about $200 million in new commitments were pledged for prevention projects over the same
time period.38
Thus, the change in funding patterns starting in 2008 reveal a two dimensional shift in
strategic priorities related to HPAI prevention. First, as global public health leaders seek to
expand work other than that directly related to HPAI, projects aimed at increasing biosecurity in
poultry production has become a lower funding priority. Second, within HPAI work, the priority
of such prevention programs was diminished again as donors and international public health
organizations shifted funding from prevention and towards HPAI response efforts. As discussed
next, there are several reasons for this shift in priorities, including the H1N1 pandemic of 2009,
political momentum behind the “One World, One Health” initiative and its funding needs, and
revelations about the sources of HPAI risk in poultry production in developing nations as well as
the difficulty of changing behaviors for the sake of improving biosecurity among backyard
farmers.

C. The Shift Away From HPAI Prevention After the 2009 H1N1 Pandemic
The period of time over which funding for HPAI prevention projects shrunk substantially
coincides with the H1N1 pandemic and the global response to it. As this section explains, the

36

See UN and World Bank, Animal and Pandemic Influenza: A Framework for Sustaining Momentum at 38, figure
2-5 (July 2010).

37
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experience of H1N1 focused public attention on the inadequacy of the world‟s vaccine
production capacity. As a result, expanding that capacity and shortening the time period between
isolating a novel influenza virus and having in hand the quantity of vaccine necessary to protect
the world‟s population became top priorities.
The 2009 novel H1N1 influenza virus first emerged as a human threat in March 2009 in
Mexico.39 It spread to the U.S. in April of that year,40 prompting the Acting Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to declare a public health emergency. 41 By the
end of May, the virus had moved worldwide.42 In June 2009 the World Health Organization
(WHO) declared a pandemic citing several reasons.43 First, the virus was novel, 44 meaning that
human immunity developed from prior influenza strains offered little or no protection against the
2009 H1N1 strain. 45 Second, the virus had spread rapidly infecting approximately 30,000

39

CDC, Outbreak of Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Infection – Mexico, March – April 2009, MMWR
(April 30, 2009). For a summaryof the H1N1 pandemic, see CIDRAP, Pandemic H1N1 2009 Overview available at
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/swineflu/biofacts/h1n1_panview.html (last updated December
16, 2010); CDC, The 2009 H1N1 Pandemic: Summary Highlights, April 2009-April 2010 available at
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/cdcresponse.htm (last updated June 16, 2010).
40

CDC, Swine Influenza A (H1N1) Infection in Two Children – Southern California, March – April 2009, MMWR
(April 21, 2009); CDC, The 2009 H1N1 Pandemic: Summary Highlights, April 2009-April 2010 available at
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/cdcresponse.htm (last updated June 16, 2010).
41

See HHS, Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists (April 26, 2009), available at
http://www.flu.gov/professional/federal/h1n1emergency042609.html.

42

WHO, Timeline of Influenza A(H1N1) Cases available at
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/interactive_map/en/index.html.
43

See Statement to the press by WHO Director-General Dr Margaret Chan (June 11, 2009), available at
http://who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_pandemic_phase6_20090611/en/index.html.

44

See id.

45

See CIDRAP, Pandemic H1N1 2009 Overview available at
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/swineflu/biofacts/h1n1_panview.html (last updated December
16, 2010).
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individuals in 74 countries over two or three months. 46 Third, it acted differently from seasonal
flu, infecting young and otherwise healthy individuals in large numbers. 47
In response to the pandemic, private vaccine manufacturers in cooperation with WHO
and its laboratories used the isolated virus to develop a vaccine on an emergency basis48 pursuant
to WHO‟s 2006 Global Action Plan.49 This Plan was developed following outbreaks of H5N1
bird flu in southeast Asia in 2003 and 2004 when WHO determined that global capacity for the
production of pandemic vaccine was about 500 million doses per year, billions of doses short of
the quantity needed to vaccinate the world‟s population.50 One strategy was to finance an
increase in pandemic vaccine production capacity. 51 Under the Plan world production capacity –
by 2011 – would be sufficient to produce two billion doses of pandemic vaccine within six
months of the transfer of a vaccine strain to pharmaceutical manufacturers, and – by
approximately 2016 – it would be further expanded to produce 6.7 billion doses within that same
time period.52
Although there had been substantial progress toward the goals set in the Plan by mid2009, the H1N1 experience made clear that the world‟s ability to produce and distribute a
pandemic vaccine in sufficient time and supply to serve the world‟s population was woefully

46

See Statement to the press by WHO Director-General Dr Margaret Chan (June 11, 2009), available at
http://who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2009/h1n1_pandemic_phase6_20090611/en/index.html.

47

See id.

48

See id.
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See WHO, Global Pandemic Influenza Action Plan to Increase Vaccine Supply (2006), available at
http://www.who.int/vaccines-documents/DocsPDF06/863.pdf.

50

See id. at 4.

51

See id. at 7.

52

See id. at 7.
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inadequate. The novel H1N1 influenza strain was identified and transferred to manufacturers in
May 2009. 53 Almost six months later in December 2009 – and more than three years into the
Global Action Plan – world production of pandemic vaccine totaled 534 million doses,54 only
slightly more than one-quarter of the doses called for under the Plan at the five-year mark.
As public health officials and experts assessed the lessons learned from the H1N1
pandemic, they focused on the still slow and meager production of vaccine, calling for renewed
efforts to achieve the production goals established in the WHO 2006 Global Action Plan by,
among other things, continuing to increase global production capacity.55 The Plan called for this
increase to take place over a five-to-ten-year period.56 Thus, the global community continued to
invest in building additional manufacturing capacity during and immediately after the H1N1
pandemic. Indeed, a 2010 survey revealed that seven additional vaccine manufacturing plants
were under construction and are expected to come online by 2015.57
Additionally, proposals to abandon the egg-based method of production and invest in
faster methods only increased in the aftermath of the H1N1 pandemic as a way to shorten the
time needed to develop an influenza vaccine. 58 For example, the President‟s Council of Advisors
53

See Partridge & Kieny, Global Production of Seasonal and Pandemic (H1N1) Influenza Vaccines in 2009-2010
and Comparison with Previous Estimates and Global Action Plan Targets, 28 Vaccine 4709-4712 (2010).
54

See id.

55

See id. See also Jadhav et al., Influenza Vaccine Production Capacity Building in Developing Countries:
Example of the Serum Institute of India, 2 Procedia in Vaccinology (2010) 166-171.

56

See WHO, Global Pandemic Influenza Action Plan to Increase Vaccine Supply at viii (2006), available at
http://www.who.int/vaccines-documents/DocsPDF06/863.pdf.
57

See Partridge & Kieny, Global Production of Seasonal and Pandemic (H1N1) Influenza Vaccines in 2009-2010
and Comparison with Previous Estimates and Global Action Plan Targets, 28 Vaccine 4709-4712 (2010); Jadhav et
al., Influenza Vaccine Production Capacity Building in Developing Countries: Example of the Serum Institute of
India, 2 Procedia in Vaccinology (2010) 166-171.

58

See WHO, Global Pandemic Influenza Action Plan to Increase Vaccine Supply (2006), available at
http://www.who.int/vaccines-documents/DocsPDF06/863.pdf; Bryan Walsh, One Year Later: 5 Lessons from the
H1N1 Pandemic, Time Magazine (April 27, 2010).
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on Science and Technology reviewed the problems with vaccine production during the H1N1
pandemic and concluded that valuable time could be saved by switching to existing cell-based
production methods.59 So much so that the Council recommended that the U.S. invest in
building new manufacturing plants capable of using the cell-based method of vaccine
production.60 The Council also recommended that the U.S. invest in research to develop a genebased method of vaccine production to shave even more off of the time it takes to produce
influenza vaccine during a pandemic. 61 In response, HHS has provided nearly $200 million to a
private manufacturer to help finance the construction of another cell-based vaccine production
facility, and it also has invested nearly $300 million in research toward the development of genebased vaccine production methods.62
The H1N1 pandemic was a major public health moment for the world because it tested
global pandemic planning and preparedness. It starkly displayed that, despite substantial efforts
to expand vaccine production capacity, we lack the ability to produce pandemic vaccine quickly
because of an ongoing lack of production capacity and outdated methods of production. Having
witnessed the gap that still remains between our goals for vaccine production and our
capabilities, it is not surprising that nations and health organizations should focus their attention
and spending on closing that gap before the next influenza pandemic occurs.
One consequence, however, of a renewed focus on preparing for our response to the next
pandemic is that it distracts attention and siphons funding away from efforts to prevent that
59

See PCAST, Report to the President on Reengineering the Influenza Vaccine Production Enterprise to Meet the
Challenges of Pandemic Influenza, part IV (Aug. 2010).

60

See id.

61

See id.

62

See GAO, Influenza Vaccine: Federal Investments in Alternative Technologies and Challenges to Development
and Licensure at 18-19 (June 2011).
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pandemic from occurring in first place. While it is impossible to track funding so closely as to
establish conclusively that one project has been paid for at the expense of another, it is possible
to identify some corroborating funding evidence. Funding for USAID avian influenza programs
offers one example. This funding decreased in 2010 as compared to average spending in prior
years. This is revealing because most U.S. funding for avian influenza prevention and response
work in developing nations flows through USAID. 63 Excluding high and low years, USAID
spent on average $146 million per year on foreign avian influenza projects from 2005 through
2009.64 In 2009, USAID spent $265 million on foreign avian influenza projects65 – an unusually
high amount most likely due to emergency spending on the H1N1 pandemic. Meanwhile, in
2010, at the same time that the White House was analyzing how to bolster the nation‟s pandemic
vaccine production capabilities in response to the H1N1 pandemic, USAID funding for foreign
avian influenza programs dropped to $125 million. 66 Moreover, this lesser funding was intended
to cover not only USAID‟s avian influenza spending, but also its carry-over H1N1 projects.67
The UN and World Bank also noticed that a gap had developed in 2009 between
international pledges toward international HPAI projects and actual funding received. It

63

See USAID, USAID Advances U.S. International Engagement on Avian Flu, May 16, 2006 (press release); ISAID
Launches Emerging Pandemic Threats Program, Oct. 21, 2009 (press release). See also Sophal Ear, The Political
Economy of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Combodia, 10 Int‟l J of Poultry Sci. 71, (2011) (identifying
USAID – and the CDC as its administrative partner – as the most active U.S. government agency in funding HPAI
activities in Cambodia).

64

See Congressional Research Service, Global Health: USAID Programs and Appropriations from FY2001 through
FY2010 (Aug. 13, 2009).
65

See id.

66

See id.

67

See U.S. Dept of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations FY2010 at 185 (2010).

14

attributed that gap, in part, to the need of donor nations and other organizations to re-orient its
influenza funding from HPAI toward H1N1 response projects. 68
Given the way the H1N1 pandemic focused attention on global vaccine response
capabilities, it is likely that this pandemic is partly responsible for the shift of global funding
from away from HPAI prevention and toward HPAI response programs. In other words, the
H1N1 pandemic revealed a weakness in the world‟s preparedness, and the global community
responded by moving more of its scarce resources to address that weakness, including – most
probably – some resources that otherwise had been used for prevention.
Yet this is not the only way that the H1N1 pandemic contributed to a reduction in HPAI
prevention projects. As the next section explains, it also popularized the “One World, One
Health” movement, which has now been adopted as the policy framework for combating HPAI
along with many other communicable diseases sitting at the animal-human interface.

D. Shifting Priorities and the “One World, One Health” Initiative
The emergence of a novel H1N1 virus with pandemic potential was not just a major
human public health event; it was also a big event among animal health officials and
organizations, including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO) and the World
Organization for Animal Health (OIE).69 The novel H1N1 strain infecting humans in 2009
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2009)(reporting flu-like illness among pigs); OIE, Pandemic H1N1 2009, available at http://www.oie.int/for-themedia/press-packs/pandemic-h1n1-2009/.
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originated in pigs, causing disease in those animals to which farmers and veterinarians had to
respond.70
Of key interest, however, was that the fact that the virus was a genetic reassortment of
swine, avian, and human strains that was both novel and transmissible across the swine-human
species barrier, among swine, and among humans. 71 As a result, H1N1 confirmed the
importance of veterinary public health72 in the understanding and control of zoonoses, which is
defined as “[a]ny disease or infection that is naturally transmissible from vertebrate animals to
humans and vice-versa”73 and includes H1N1 influenza and HPAI among many others. In fact,
the CDC reports that “[a]bout 75% of recently emerging infectious diseases affecting humans are
diseases of animal origin, and approximately 60% of all human pathogens are zoonotic.” 74
Experts in domestic animal and wildlife health have long advocated that human medicine
and public health must pay close attention to diseases that exist at the interface between animals
and humans. 75 In the case of influenza, this interface plays a critical role in the development of
potentially pandemic strains. Influenza viruses mutate rapidly and genetically resort easily.76
When different species of animals are in close proximity to each other, it creates the opportunity
70
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for an influenza strains unique to each of those species to resort genetically. 77 This has the
potential to create whole new strains that can move across species. When humans are in close
contact with animals, the same phenomenon occurs and the probability increases of a novel
strain that can cross between animals and humans. 78 Thus, while the biological differentiation of
species initially operates as a barrier against disease transmission, it also creates the opportunity
for whole new strains to emerge. Of course, not every novel strain of influenza poses a threat.
Even if a strain is virulent and capable of jumping from animal to human, it must also be
transmissible among humans before it has pandemic potential.
Having recognized the importance of the interface among different animal species
(domestic swine, domestic poultry, wild migratory birds) and humans, public health officials
adopted a framework to combat HPAI even before the emergence of the 2009 novel H1N1
strain. 79 It adopted the catch-phrase “One World, One Health” to capture the concept that
understanding the root causes of HPAI requires that officials account for economic, social,
ecological and biological factors that combine to create an environment in which a novel bird flu
could arise, which, in turn, requires a unified strategy among physicians and veterinarians as well
as human, domestic animal and wildlife public health workers, and ecologists.80 Such an interdisciplinary and unified strategy would permit much earlier identification of and response to
HPAI threats, more efficient use of resources, and a greater chance of addressing the source of
the HPAI threat rather than merely treating its symptoms. 81 To achieve such a broad-based
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understanding of this disease environment, however, requires a major investment in building a
domestic animal and wildlife public health infrastructure, including disease surveillance,
reporting and data systems capable of reaching anywhere in the world as well as trained
professionals to work within those systems.82 Additionally, existing animal and human health
infrastructures would need to be reworked to permit joint reporting and data sharing. 83 In the
end, implementing the One World, One Health framework to combat HPAI requires a global
investment of more than $13 billion over at least a ten-year period of time. 84
Given the enormous investment of time and money required to implement One World,
One Health, it took the scare provided by the 2009 novel H1N1 virus to motivate donor nations
and organizations worldwide to sign on to the plan.85 In addition to being endorsed by the major
international health organizations, such as WHO, FOA, OIE, the One World, One Health
approach has been adopted by the World Bank, 86 the U.S.87 (now operating a “One Health
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Office” 88 as well as a Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases “guided in part by a
holistic „One Health‟ strategy”89) and the European Commission.90 The One World, One Health
strategy has also received significant support from public officials in China, India, the UK, and
Australia. 91
The One World, One Health framework, once fully implemented over the next ten years,
will improve the world‟s ability to control HPAI through both response and prevention
strategies.92 In the short-run, however, it is siphoning resources away from HPAI programs
generally and from HPAI prevention projects in particular. One World, One Health potentially
pulls resources away from HPAI programs generally because the initiative is not specific to
HPAI. In fact, a primary goal of the initiative is to bring a wide variety disease-specific work
under a larger umbrella of zoonotic disease surveillance, data-sharing, prevention and response
work.93 One World, One Health will target at least 34 diseases other than any animal-based
influenza, including emergent diseases such as Nipah/Hendra viruses, SARS, Monkeypox, Hanta
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viruses, Rabies, Rift Valley Fever, and Q Fever as well as food borne diseases like brucellosis
and anthrax.94 While it is certainly possible for international health organizations and donor
nations to fund and operate programs on a wide variety of diseases at once without diminishing
the resources available for HPAI work, it is equally possible that HPAI projects are neglected as
resources are stretched over a larger number of disease priorities based on the One World, One
Health initiative. 95
In addition to drawing attention and resource to zoonotic diseases other than HPAI, the
One World, One Health initiative is also likely to shift funding within HPAI work from
prevention and toward response projects. To become operational One World, One Health
requires a coordinated animal-human health infrastructure that does not currently exist and will
take at least ten years to build at an initial cost of at least $13 billion.96 This is a substantial
financial burden on the public health budgets of donor nations and international health
organizations that threatens to consume resources that might otherwise be spent on HPAI
projects. In fact, FAO – the international agency responsible for implementation of the One
World, One Health frame work – has acknowledged that this siphoning effect is occurring. It
noted the following when explaining why funding for new HPAI projects plummeted by 94
percent in the two-year period from 2008 to 2010:
This trend is at least in part due to the broader contextual changes taking place in the
thinking within the international animal health and donor community on the need to
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move away from disease specific interventions to a more holistic and integrated approach
to building sustainable animal health systems at country, regional and global levels. 97
The statement about “moving away from disease specific interventions” and toward “a more
holistic and integrated approach” is a direct reference to the One World, One Health concept.
Moreover, any shift of resources has and will continue to disproportionately affect HPAI
prevention projects as compared to response programming. This is because so much of the One
World, One Health infrastructure is a designed to respond to zoonotic disease outbreaks,
including HPAI. The initiative seeks the capability to survey a wide variety of diseases in their
domestic animal, wild animal, and human hosts anywhere in the world so that an outbreak
response can begin quickly at the very source of the problem. Thus, all of the surveillance
systems, interdisciplinary coordination, data-sharing, and animal health training that the initiative
seeks to build over the next ten years have the primary purpose of preparing for and responding
to a disease outbreak.98 Prevention is certainly part of the initiative, and information gathered
using the response infrastructure envisioned by One World, One Health is valuable to a
prevention effort. Yet, they are not investments directly in prevention. While building the
response infrastructure first may certainly be a prudent strategy, it is crowding-out HPAI
prevention and assigning it a lower priority at least until the One World, One Health
infrastructure has been completed.
The shift of resources toward the project of building the One World, One Health
infrastructure and is already evident in now dormant HPAI programming that was once funded
through international aid departments of the US and UK governments. For example, a project
97
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aimed at preventing HPAI infections through improved biosecurity education among small-scale
farmers in developing nations closed as of January 2011.99 It was operated by the International
Food Policy Research Institute and was funded primarily by the UK‟s Department for
International Development.100 No other UK-funded project seems to be taking its place.
Likewise, a USAID-funded project called “STOP AI” was funded only through mid-2010.101
Additionally, a similar USAID-funded project in Indonesia has ended,102 and no other USAID
funding appears to be going directly to any other HPAI projects. In fact, all of the USAID HPAI
projects are closely related to the goal of building the One World, One Health infrastructure. In
its 2011 summary of its health programs, USAID notes that it will continue to fund a grant to
FAO as the lead international organization in combating zoonotic disease as well as an
international program to develop a global warning system for emerging wildlife diseases. 103
In the end, the One World, One Health initiative, and, in particular, its effort to build a
new zoonotic disease response infrastructure over the next ten years, is one of the major reasons
for the diminishment of funding for HPAI projects generally and for HPAI prevention projects
specifically. The siphoning of resources away from HPAI is likely to continue for at least as
long as it takes to complete the One World, One Health infrastructure.
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E. Shifting Priorities and the Complexity of HPAI Prevention
A third reason why global funding for HPAI work has shifted dramatically away from
prevention projects is that they are highly complex projects designed to change the behaviors of
poultry producers, and they have had very limited effect to date. To succeed, these projects
require a great deal of time and – thus – funding, and they must be narrowly targeted. In the
long-run, they are likely worth the investment because prevention work makes it more likely that
we avoid the start of an expensive pandemic. In the short-run, however, they are a much less
attractive investment of resources precisely because they will continue to have only limited
effect. All of this is explained in greater detail in this section.
HPAI prevention projects focus on preventing the infection of poultry in the first place,
or, if poultry are infected, then preventing the transmission of that infection to any human, or
both. The common tools for preventing infection of a flock, especially when poultry are kept in
densely populated commercial production facilities, include: routine disinfection of poultry
living spaces as well as processing equipment; isolation of new additions to a flock until it is
determined that they are disease-free; isolation of any diseased bird from the healthy flock; either
spot or mass vaccination of healthy poultry; culling and proper disposal of diseased birds. 104
It can be extremely difficult to implement these tools in the various poultry farming
sectors in many developing nations. For one, there may not be an economic incentive for the
poultry producer to assure that the producer‟s poultry is disease free. 105 If consumers in the
particular location are not demanding verification that poultry are disease free, then neither those

104

See Jessica H. Leibler et al., supra note 15; FAO et al., Pro-Poor HPAI Risk Reduction: Lessons from Southeast
Asia and Africa at 13 (Oct. 2010) (research meeting proceedings), available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/HPAI/WKS101025_puket_proceedings.pdf.

105

See id.

23

who operate the markets in which poultry are sold nor those who produce the poultry are likely
to consider the risk unless there is an outbreak that shuts down business for a time. Moreover,
taking steps to create a production environment or a market environment where disease is
unlikely to occur imposes additional costs that a producer or market operator will not incur
unless there is a market demand for undertaking those costs.106 Thus, prevention projects often
must use small pilot projects to estimate whether consumers would pay a higher price for
chicken that has been produced and marketed in such a way as to assure that it is disease free,
and, if so, how much more they would likely pay. 107 This is then used to persuade producers and
marketers that it is worth undertaking the additional costs.
Even still there will be difficulty because different size poultry producers will be able to
absorb those costs differently. While undertaking costs associated with isolating birds,
disinfecting birds, vaccinating birds, etc. may be feasible for large commercial producers, the
same is not necessarily true for smaller commercial producers and backyard farmers. For some
the size of their flock is too small to justify the initial investment even if there is a market for
chicken that is guaranteed to be disease free. 108 Thus, many producers must decide whether to
increase the size of their operations or to operate as part of “black market” or to stop producing
poultry all together.109 Where prevention depends on those sorts of major changes in the
structure of the market, prevention will come slowly if at all.
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A second reason it can be difficult to change behaviors among commercial poultry
producers and marketers is that they may distrust government and outside influence, which can
make it nearly impossible to learn what the producers‟ behaviors are in the first place and to
verify that new behaviors are occurring. 110 Several developing nations lack a strong regulatory
environment in which officials are authorized to inspect private businesses. 111 Thus, officials
and prevention project workers are left to appeal to the good will of the producer or marketer to
allow an inspection and to discuss changing behaviors. Where distrust exists of the government
or of outsiders or both, this distrust can be a substantial barrier to implementing any prevention
measures. Thus, project workers often find themselves first building trust among the community
before engaging in any attempt to change behavior. Additionally, trust is generally built slowly
on a person-to-person basis, which means that the initial phase of the project can take a very long
time indeed.
A third and related reason prevention work is difficult is that governments in some
developing nations are quick to cull diseased poultry – often more than is necessary to stop the
disease – but very slow to provide compensation for culled poultry. 112 Again, this affects
different poultry producers differently depending on their size. Large producers generally have
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the financial means to absorb losses brought on by culling while smaller producers often do not.
As a result, the smallest producers have an incentive to hide their poultry from officials 113 and
sell them quickly on a black market or to consume them personally. 114 Thus prevention projects
often must first help establish a culling compensation program that operates for some time so as
to establish trust in the community that it is safe to report disease and to cooperate with a
program of culling.115
Prevention projects have had the most success among large commercial producers
because they have been able to persuade producers that selling poultry guaranteed to be disease
free is profitable in both the short and long runs. 116 Yet, success has come slowly for the reasons
explained above. Because of these successes, prevention work has focused on developing
public-private partnerships designed to create standards for hygienic and biosecure poultry
production as well as systems for helping consumers to verify that the chicken they are buying
was produced in such an environment.117 In fact, the One World, One Health initiative has
adopted this public-private approach for its prevention work.118
While harnessing market incentives and creating biosecurity standards may work for
large commercial producers, this will not work with many small-scale producers and backyard
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farmers. Small-scale commercial producers, as explained above will likely find that it is too
costly to abide by those standards given the size of his flock, in which case the producer must
decide whether to grow, get out of the business, or ignore the standards.119
Backyard farmers are altogether different, and changing their husbandry practices is even
more time consuming and difficult than changing the behaviors of commercial producers. One
reason for this is that they tend to be very poor.120 With few resources, there is nothing to spend
on cages or cleaning equipment or fencing. As a result, chickens roam out in the open on village
roads, in residential yards and in residences themselves.121 This creates more of an opportunity
for influenza to spread from bird to bird and from bird to human. Additionally, village chickens
are much more likely than commercial birds to come into contact with other domesticated
animals such as pigs or wild birds that also live in the area or are migrating. 122 This creates a
chance for an influenza virus to move from animal species to animal species, increasing the odds
of a dangerous genetic re-assortment and a novel virus.
The fact that most backyard poultry farmers are extremely poor also means that they are
more dependent on their chickens as a source of food or income or both. 123 Consequently, they
are very unlikely to cooperate with any disease surveillance program that might result in their
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losing some or all of their flocks.124 Instead, they are far more likely to create other
opportunities for transmission of influenza by eating an infected chicken or selling or trading it
outside of the village.125 As a result, a successful prevention program must employ “pro-poor
strategies” for increasing biosecurity without much if any financial outlay for the farmer. So, for
example, a backyard farmer is unlikely to have the resources to purchase disinfectant on a
regular basis. Consequently, a public health worker might, as an alternative, recommend that a
farmer burn and rebuild a coop in which infected chickens resided.
Another characteristic of backyard poultry farms in many developing nations is that they
are located in villages that tend to be in remote locations. As a result, they are unlikely to be part
of commercial networks of any real significance. 126 Consequently, market incentives are very
unlikely to motivate the backyard poultry farmer to make his farm more biosecure.
A third characteristic of backyard poultry farmers in developing nations is that they tend
to have a limited understanding of pathogens and disease transmission. 127 In fact, their
understanding of disease can often be based on myths that lack scientific foundation. 128 Thus, in
many instances, public health workers first must become familiar with the level of understanding
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about disease so as to design a method to challenge any myths in order to teach basic lessons
about pathogens and their transmission. 129
Finally, language can also be a challenge for public health workers running a HPAI
prevention project in a village with backyard poultry farmers.130 Remote villages in some
developing nations might speak a different dialect of the prominent national language or
secondary, indigenous language. Program workers must always be careful to learn the precise
meaning of the words they intend to use in communicating public health messages to farmers
and villagers.131 This is to avoid using a word that has one meaning in the nation‟s capital and a
different meaning in that village. 132
Because of these common characteristics of backyard poultry farmers in developing
nations where HPAI is endemic, public health workers must take a great deal of time to design
and implement an intervention that is tailored to the particular characteristics of that village.133
Consequently, the work is very slow – even slower than prevention projects in the commercial
sectors – and presents an even greater chance of failure. Moreover, because of the idiosyncrasies
of each village, lessons learned in one village may not be applicable to the next village.
Consequently, it can take a large number of workers and a lot of time for prevention programs to
make a real difference among backyard poultry farmers.
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Given these complexities, it is understandable why officials and donor countries might
question the strategy of investing equally in prevention and response programs. If those
programs cannot produce measureable improvements in biosecurity in the short run, then it is
reasonable to plan for the probability that the next novel influenza with pandemic potential
cannot be prevented. It follows then that policy makers might shift funding from prevention
programs to response programs at least in the short run with the intent to shift funding back to
prevention programs only when sufficient global response systems are in place. 134
Whether this was the thinking behind the shift of funding from prevention programs to
response projects that the UN and World Bank observed in 2008 through 2010 is impossible to
establish conclusively. Yet there is anecdotal evidence that donor nations and international
health organizations were learning about the complexities of prevention programs generally (and
prevention programs aimed at backyard farming in particular) during the same time period as the
shift in funding was taking place.
Consider, for example, a July 2009 report by an independent auditor of a USAID-funded
prevention and response project in Indonesia. 135 The report reveals that, at a mid-point of the
project, funders discovered that the work with backyard farmers was having very limited success
and that the primary incidence of HPAI among poultry was in the commercial sectors. 136 The
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auditors discovered that public health workers, despite having substantial funding and despite
running many well-organized training sessions among backyard farmers, could not identify that
these training sessions changed farmers‟ behaviors.137 This explained why funding of the project
changed dramatically when funds for training and prevention in the backyard sector was shifted
to commercial sectors.138 This, of course, coincides with the timing of the global shift of funding
observed by the UN and World Bank that took place starting in mid-2008. 139
Thus, this 2009 audit provides a good example of the logic behind moving prevention
funding from backyard farmers to commercial poultry producers. Commercial producers were
growing rapidly and were managing larger flocks, and, in this way, presented an opportunity for
greater incidence of HPAI. Additionally, commercial producers were tied into marketing
networks, which provided an opportunity HPAI to be spread among participants in the markets
when flocks were sold among suppliers or slaughtered and sold at the retail level. Meanwhile
backyard farmers had smaller flocks and were only sporadically and remotely tied to market
networks. This explained why the incidence of HPAI among backyard farmers was lower than
among commercial producers. Yet, backyard farmers were susceptible to infection once HPAI
emerged among their birds because of their close physical connection to their poultry and their
limited understanding of or ability to implement more biosecure husbandry. As the independent
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auditor put it, “sector 4 [the backyard farming sector] probably represents the sentinel victim of
infection, rather than the „engine room‟ of HPAI dynamics.” 140

Conclusion: Shifting Priorities and HPAI Control Over the Next Ten Years
This Article identified three possible reasons that combine together to explain why the
global public health community, in 2008, dramatically shifted funding from prevention programs
aimed largely at poor backyard poultry farmers and toward response projects as well as
prevention and response projects aimed at large commercial poultry producers. In so doing, it
reveals a shift in public health priorities that has taken place.
First and foremost, while officials, international health organizations, and donor countries
have not given up on preventing the next influenza pandemic, they have become much more
focused on preparing the world to respond to an HPAI outbreak. Additionally, they have
determined that our ability to respond depends on incorporating animal health information into
our understanding of the public health risks of pandemic influenza. This is reflected in the work
of FAO, OIE, WHO and the World Bank planned over the next ten years to implement the One
World, One Health framework. Moreover, some individual countries along with some
international health organizations emphasize that global preparedness for the next influenza
pandemic turns on our ability to improve the speed with which we manufacture a vaccine.
Based on these priorities, we will witness a substantial increase in animal health
infrastructure as well as a coordination of data-sharing systems between animal and human
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health officials. Additionally, we will see a deliberate effort at interdisciplinary cooperation with
respect to public health work on all zoonotic diseases.
A second priority revealed by this analysis is that time is of the essence and so
investments in HPAI programs must pay dividends in the short run. This is revealed both in the
emphasis that has been placed on funding the creation of new surveillance and data-sharing
systems as part of the One World, One Health initiative and the decision to prevent infections by
focusing on large commercial poultry production sites and using market incentives to generate
quick improvements in biosecurity all across that sector of the poultry market.
As indicated throughout this Article, we should expect as a result of this focus on shortrun gains that HPAI prevention projects will be fewer over the next ten years, and what projects
are funded will likely exclude backyard farmers where market incentives are a much less
effective tool for promoting biosecurity. This creates a great risk that the interests of backyard
farmers, their families and their villages will not be adequately protected while short-run projects
are a high priority. Specifically, the risk is that we will see a spike in HPAI infections humans
among villagers where backyard farming takes place because so few resources are likely to be
spent on educating those individuals about how to protect their poultry and themselves.
Additionally, there is the risk that HPAI infections among animals will spike as well, which also
threatens the welfare of backyard farmers by significantly diminishing or wiping out poultry
flocks that are a source of both income and food.
Of course, the short-run strategy also is risky for what it ignores in the long-run. It is like
the old saying – an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Investment in HPAI
prevention is, in the long-run, a necessary investment because preventing a pandemic is so much
less expensive than fighting it after it has emerged. Consequently, using international resources
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to build the “One World One Health” infrastructure and to target HPAI prevention among
commercial producers in developing countries may be valuable and even efficient, but it should
not happen at the expense of prevention projects aimed at protecting backyard poultry farmers,
who are among the most vulnerable potential victims of bird flu.
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